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“Balancing” Free Expression and
Religious Feelings in E.S. v.
Austria: Blasphemy by Any
Other Name?
John G. Wrench 1
Abstract
The European Court of Human Rights’ 2018 decision in E.S. v.
Austria upheld an Austrian court’s conviction based on
“disparaging religious doctrine.” The Court took this opportunity
to reaffirm problematic, decades-old precedent, while creating
new contradictions in its analysis of free expression claims.
Despite the EU’s modern opposition to the criminalization of
blasphemy, E.S. v. Austria in effect sends a contradictory
message. This Comment explores the roots of the Court’s struggle
to find an appropriate balance between the values of religious
tolerance and freedom of expression, analyzes the Court’s recent
decision, and suggests future paths to recalibrate the Court’s
approach to these two fundamental rights.
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Introduction
In 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) upheld
an Austrian court’s conviction of a woman after she made several
statements about Muhammad at a seminar on the “Basics of Islam.” 2
A member of the right-wing Freedom Party Education Institute, “Ms.
E.S.” hosted two public seminars in 2014, where she criticized
Muhammad’s relationship with his wife, Aisha. 3 Ms. E.S. was
subsequently convicted for “disparaging religious doctrines,” a criminal
violation in Austria. 4
The ECtHR noted that although Article 10 of the Convention on
Human Rights (the “Convention”) establishes a right to free expression,
that right must be balanced against the right to religious freedom
established by Article 9. 5 Under the Court’s precedent, the right to free
expression may be validly proscribed when it is incompatible with
respect for the religion of others. 6 Furthermore, as a departure from its
typical free expression analysis, the ECtHR scrutinized the speaker’s
objectivity, weighed the value judgment’s factual basis, and granted
remarkable deference to Austria’s courts and legislative goals. 7 The
ECtHR held that both the statement’s weak factual basis and Ms.
E.S.’s subjectivity militated against protecting her expression.8
Furthermore, the Court concluded that states are obligated to restrict
expression capable of inciting Muslims to “justified indignation.” 9
The ECtHR’s decision has been criticized by observers both within
and outside the EU. 10 Some commentators from nations with more
absolutist free expression regimes, particularly the United States, were

2.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 6-8, 58 (Oct. 25,
2018),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-187188
[https://perma.cc/RRX8-NTVB].

3.

Id. ¶ 13.

4.

Id. ¶¶ 10-12.

5.

Id. ¶ 43.

6.

Id. ¶ 45.

7.

Id. ¶¶ 47, 48.

8.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶¶ 54–55.

9.

Id. ¶ 57.

10.

See Stijn Smet, E.S. v. Austria: Freedom of Expression versus Religious
Feelings, the Sequel, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2018/11/07/e-s-v-austria-freedom-ofexpression-versus-religious-feelings-the-sequel/ [https://perma.cc/74NVWJDH].
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shocked at what appeared to be a draconian prosecution. 11 Similarly,
some within the EU viewed the case as a sign of the times—an
indication that the EU is slipping deeper into an intolerant climate of
speech-suppression. 12
This Comment explores the ECtHR’s problematic application of its
free expression precedent, placing particular emphasis on the Court’s
novel and contradictory analysis. Part I relates the facts of the case and
the Court’s reasoning, while describing the doctrinal relationship
between Article 9’s right to religious freedom and Article 10’s right to
free expression. Part II analyzes the Court’s holding with the following
questions in mind: First, is the holding in E.S. v. Austria an accurate
application of the Court’s free expression and religious freedom
precedents? Second, in a prescriptive spirit, what are the strengths and
weaknesses of the Court’s approach in light of the rights protected by
the Convention on Human Rights? The Comment concludes with
suggestions for how the ECtHR should recalibrate its approach to the
interaction of free expression and religious freedom, to better protect
both fundamental rights in the future.

I.

THE OFFENDING STATEMENTS, APPEALS, AND THE
ECTHR’S RULING

A. Ms. E.S.’s Statements and Conviction in the Regional Court
In 2008, Ms. E.S. began holding seminars on the “Basics of Islam”
at the Freedom Party Education Institute (“Freedom Party”) in
Vienna. 13 Those interested in attending could learn about upcoming
seminars as Freedom Party members, as invitees, or by viewing the
publicly accessible Freedom Party website. 14 The Freedom Party also
advertised the lectures through leaflets “specifically aimed at young
voters,” inviting attendees to take part in a “free education package.”15
The two seminars at which Ms. E.S. made the statements in question
11.

See, e.g., Simon Cottee, A Flawed European Ruling on Free Speech, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018) (suggesting that “it is hard not to read the . .
. ruling as a concession to those who wouldn’t hesitate to interpret E.S.’s
comments not just as offensive, but as deserving of a murderous
retaliation.”); see also Brendan O’Neill, In Europe and in Pakistan, Two
Women Are Condemned for Insulting Muhammad, REASON (Nov. 1, 2018)
(“Pluralism cannot survive without free expression, and free expression
requires tolerance of criticism . . . [the ECtHR] has failed not only to
defend the liberty of E.S., but of all Europeans—Christian, Muslim, and
atheists alike.”).

12.

See Smet, supra note 10 (describing the Court’s reasoning as a “contrived”
and “nonsensical” extension of the Court’s existing precedent).

13.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶¶ 6-7.

14.

Id. ¶ 7.

15.

Id.
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were held in October and November of the following year, with
approximately thirty participants attending each seminar. 16 One
attendee—an undercover journalist—reported Ms. E.S.’s statements to
their employer, who contacted the local authorities. 17
Following an investigation, the prosecutor initially brought charges
against Ms. E.S. for “inciting hatred,” but Vienna’s Regional Criminal
Court acquitted her for two reasons. 18 First, the prosecutor willingly
withdrew the indictment as applied to particular statements; and
second, the prosecutor failed to establish that Ms. E.S. made some of
the statements as written in the indictment. 19 Her victory was shortlived, as the Regional Court nevertheless convicted Ms. E.S. of
“disparaging religious doctrines.” 20
The Regional Court identified three specific statements on which
the conviction was based. 21 First, Ms. E.S. argued that Muslims,
specifically male Muslims, are called to imitate Muhammad because he
is seen as the ideal man. 22 She then criticized that expectation, on the
grounds that Muhammad was a “warlord,” had “many women,” and
“liked to do it with children.” 23 Second, Ms. E.S. stated that the Sahih
Al-Bukhari is the most important of the Hadith collections, where “the
thing with Aisha and child sex is written.” 24 Third, Ms. E.S. repeated
a conversation she had with her sister, in which she stated, “A 56-yearold and a six-year-old? What do you call that? Give me an example?
What do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?” 25
Some background on what Ms. E.S. was referring to is important
for understanding the context of the court’s analysis. Aisha was the
third wife of Muhammad and daughter of the first caliph, Abu Bakr. 26
In one of the “most authentic collections” of the Sahih al-Bukhari
hadith, Aisha stated that “[t]he Messenger of God married me when I

16.

Id. ¶ 8.

17.

Id. ¶¶ 8-9.

18.

Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.

19.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 12.

20.

Id.

21.

Id. ¶ 13.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 13.

26.

A’ishah,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aishah[https://perma.cc/A6Q5ZURT].
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was six, and consummated the marriage with me when I was nine.”27
In response to both external criticism and inter-Islamic debate, some
scholars justify the marriage in historical context, 28 while others
challenge the accuracy of Aisha’s statement. 29
The Regional Court found that Ms. E.S.’s statements “essentially
conveyed” that Muhammad had “paedophilic tendencies” and
suggested that he was not a “worthy subject of worship.” 30 The court
stated that the term “paedophile” implied a “primary sexual interest”
in pre-pubescent children, which disregarded the fact that Aisha
remained with Muhammad until his death—when she was eighteen
years old and clearly past the age of puberty. 31 The court concluded
that the statements were “capable of causing indignation,” and that it
was possible for at least a portion of the audience to be disturbed by
the statements. 32
The Regional Court rejected that Ms. E.S.’s statements were
protected by Article 10’s right to free expression, relying on two
separate but related points. First, while Section 1 of Article 10
establishes that individuals have the right to free expression, the court
noted that the right is subject to “duties and responsibilities” under
Section 2. 33 Such duties include refraining from making statements
which “hurt others without reason and therefore did not contribute to
a debate of public interest.” 34 The court found that Ms. E.S. had not
made statements of fact, but value judgments aimed at “degrad[ing]
Muhammad,” outside of Article 10’s protection. 35 Second, Article 9’s
protection of the freedom to religion can require States to ensure that
religious views are not attacked in a “provocative way capable of
27.

Muhammad’s Marriage to Ayesha, ISLAMFYI, Princeton University (Sep.
19, 2017), https://islamfyi.princeton.edu/is-it-true-that-muhammadmarried-a-child-bride-by-the-name-of-ayesha-when-he-was-53-and-shewas-9-years-old-if-so-how-do-muslims-justify-this-from-their-exemplaryprophet/ [https://perma.cc/6GAY-SNF9].

28.

See, e.g., COLIN TURNER, ISLAM: THE BASICS 34 (2d ed. 2011) (stating that
“[a] marriage between an older man and a young girl was customary
among the Bedouins,” particularly if the marriage had “direct political
significance” to the families).

29.

See, e.g., MAULANA MUHAMMAD ALI & JOHN HAYTON, MUHAMMAD THE
PROPHET (2011) (stating that Aisha “could not have been less than ten”
at the time of her marriage).

30.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 14.

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id. ¶ 15.

34.

Id.

35.

Id.
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hurting the feelings” of religious individuals. 36 Thus, after balancing the
rights at stake, the court held that Ms. E.S.’s conviction was justified
and necessary to “protect religious peace” in Austria. 37

B. Appeals in Austrian Courts
Ms. E.S. appealed the Regional Court’s judgment on several
grounds. First, that her statements were not value judgments, but
statements of fact based on the documents submitted for evidence;38
second, that she had merely questioned whether an adult having sexual
intercourse with a nine-year-old “amounted to paedophilia”; 39 and,
third, that she had used the term “paedophile” in the way it was
commonly used—referring to “men who have sex with minors”—not in
a strict scientific sense. 40 Lastly, Ms. E.S. reiterated that her statements
were protected by Article 10’s establishment of the right to “impart
opinions and ideas that offend, shock, or disturb.” 41
The Vienna Court of Appeals (the “Court of Appeals”) dismissed
Ms. E.S.’s claim, affirming the lower court’s factual findings and noting
that her statements were “wrong and offensive” even if the factual claim
was accurate. 42 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals stated that
“paedophilia” denotes a primary sexual interest in children, and
therefore no “reliable sources” supported Ms. E.S.’s statements. 43 The
Court of Appeals concluded that Article 10 permits individuals to
express “harsh criticism of churches or religious societies,” this
protection ends at “insults and mockery of a religious belief or person
of worship.” 44
Ms. E.S. next lodged an appeal with the Austrian Supreme Court,
which dismissed her application and upheld the lower court’s
reasoning. 45 Interferences with Article 10’s protections could be justified
by the need to protect religious peace and religious feelings under
Article 9, 46 and courts must balance these rights to determine whether

36.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 15.

37.

Id.

38.

Id. ¶ 16.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 17.

43.

Id. ¶ 18.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. ¶¶ 20-22.

46.

Id. ¶ 21.
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a statement is capable of “arousing justified indignation.” 47 The court
held that, as a consequences of balancing Articles 9 and 10, Ms. E.S.
had aimed to defame Muhammad in order to show that he was not
worthy of worship—not to “contribute to a serious debate about Islam
or the phenomenon of child marriage.” 48

C. The ECtHR Ruling
Ms. E.S. appealed to the ECtHR, which issued its ruling on October
25, 2018. 49 The ECtHR pointed out that both parties agreed that there
had been an interference with Ms. E.S.’s right to free expression. 50 That
interference, however, could be justified if it was “prescribed by law,”
pursued a “legitimate aim” under Section 2 of Article 10 and was
“necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve that aim. 51 The
Court moved quickly through the first two questions—the Austrian law
prescribed convictions for disparaging religious doctrines, for the
legitimate aims of safeguarding religious peace and protecting religious
feelings. 52 These aims constituted “protecting the rights of others”
under Section 2 of Article 10 and could therefore justify an interference
with the right to free expression. 53 The issue was thus whether or not
Ms. E.S.’s conviction was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve
those aims. 54
The ECtHR began its analysis by examining Article 10’s two
sections. 55 Section 1 establishes the right to free expression, while
Section 2 states there are duties and responsibilities for those exercising
the right. 56 Under Otto-Preminger-Institute, 57 the Court continued,
Article 9 justifies the restriction of “gratuitously offensive” and
“profane” expressions:
Where such expressions go beyond the limits of a critical denial
of other people’s religious beliefs and are likely to incite religious
intolerance, for example in the event of an improper or even
abusive attack on an object of religious veneration, a State may
47.

Id.

48.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 22.

49.

Id. ¶ 58.

50.

Id. ¶ 39.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. ¶¶ 40, 41.

53.

Id. ¶ 41.

54.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 42.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

See Smet, supra note 8.
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legitimately consider them to be incompatible with respect for the
freedom of thought, consciences and religion and take
proportionate restrictive measures . . . 58

Furthermore, national authorities are due a “margin of
appreciation” in determining whether a restriction is necessary in a
democratic society, to account for the lack of a uniform conception of
morality in the EU. 59
The ECtHR proceeded to apply these principles, affirming the lower
courts’ holdings on several grounds. 60 First, the ECtHR stated that Ms.
E.S.—as an “expert in the field of Islamic doctrine”—”must have been
aware that her statements were partly based on untrue facts and apt
to arouse (justified) indignation.” 61 Therefore, not only did her
statements fail to further the purposes of Article 10, but national
authorities had a positive duty under Article 9 to restrict these
statements to ensure an “atmosphere of mutual tolerance.” 62 Second,
although courts are incapable of judging the truth of a value
judgment, 63 the ECtHR found that Ms. E.S.’s statements were not
based on a “sufficient factual basis” to receive protection under Article
10. 64 Lastly, the Court held that the conviction and attendant fine were
not disproportionate in light of how strict the punishment could have
been. 65 The Court concluded that the Austrian courts had not
overstepped their “wide” margin of appreciation in determining the
balance between Ms. E.S.’s “right to free expression with the rights of
others to have their religious feelings protected . . .” 66

58.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 40.

59.

Id. ¶ 44 (“The absence of a uniform European conception of the
requirements of the protection of the rights of others in relation to attacks
on their religious convictions broadens the Contracting States’ margin of
appreciation when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters
liable to offend personal convictions within the sphere of morals or
religion.”).

60.

Id. ¶ 53.

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63.

Id. ¶ 54.

64.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 54.

65.

See id. ¶ 56 (stating that “the fine imposed was on the lower end” of the
statutory range and that the “Criminal Code alternatively would have
provided for up to six months’ imprisonment.”).

66.

Id. ¶ 57.
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II. E.S. V. AUSTRIA REAFFIRMED OTTO-PREMINGERINSTITUT; FUTURE CASES MUST ABANDON BOTH

A. Organic Application of Precedent, or Strange Outgrowth?
A fundamental premise of the ECtHR’s holding is that a national
authority can justifiably restrict expressions capable of hurting religious
feelings or religious peace. 67 Reading the text of Article 9, it is not
obvious that the right to religious freedom could be violated by
mocking, insulting, or harshly critical expressions. Indeed, the concept
that gratuitously offensive expressions can interfere with the right to
freedom of religion stems from the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 9
in Otto-Preminger-Institut. 68
Otto-Preminger-Institut revolved around an organization that
attempted to host six showings of a film, Das Liebeskonzil (“Council of
Love” 69), which caricatured several features of Christian belief.70
Advertisements did not include information about the film’s content,
the showings were age-restricted, and attendees were required to pay a
“fee” to enter. 71 The film was to be shown in a majority-Catholic area.
The organization was convicted for disparaging religious doctrines after
being reported by a Catholic organization. 72
The ECtHR upheld the conviction in Otto-Preminger-Institut,
finding that in “extreme cases,” particular “methods of opposing or
denying religious beliefs can . . . inhibit those who hold such beliefs
from exercising their freedom to hold and express them.”73
Furthermore, the ECtHR noted that the goals of Article 10 are not
achieved by protecting “gratuitously offensive” expressions, which are
incapable of contributing to “any form of public debate.” 74 The ECtHR
concluded by noting that while national authorities are due a “certain
margin of appreciation” in determining whether an interference was
necessary in a democratic society, the margin of appreciation is not

67.

Id.

68.

Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1994)
[hereinafter Otto-Preminger-Institut].

69.

The ECtHR translated the title as “Council in Heaven” in English, but
“the French text of the decision, more accurately . . . translated [it] as ‘Le
Concile d’amour.’” Javier Martínez-Torrón, Limitations on Religious
Freedom in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 19
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 587, n. 144 (2005).

70.

Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 34.

71.

Id. at 44.

72.

Id. at 37.

73.

Id. at 43.

74.

Id.
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“unlimited.” 75 Moreover, in cases where there has been an interference
with the rights protected by Article 10, “supervision must be strict
because of the importance of the freedoms in question.” 76
In some ways, the ECtHR’s holding in E.S. v. Austria follows
naturally from Otto-Preminger-Institut. First, and perhaps most
important, is the principle that Article 9 obligates national authorities
to restrict expressions capable of hurting religious feelings or disrupting
religious peace. 77 The Court merely reapplies this doctrine in E.S. v.
Austria. 78 Secondly, in E.S. v. Austria, the ECtHR simply cited OttoPreminger-Institut for the idea that Article 10’s goals are not achieved
by protecting “gratuitously offensive” expressions, as they do not
contribute to public dialogue. 79 A third application of Otto-PremingerInstitut is the Court’s finding that convictions based on “disparaging
religious doctrines” (the same conviction in both Otto-PremingerInstitut and E.S. v. Austria) for the purpose of protecting religious
feelings and religious peace, is a legitimate goal and justifies an
interference with Article 10. 80 Lastly, the ECtHR upheld the
convictions in Otto-Preminger-Institut and E.S. v. Austria even though
no individual’s religious feelings were actually harmed—the expression’s
ability to create “justified indignation” was entirely hypothetical. 81
By introducing other questions into its analysis, however, the
ECtHR’s holding represents a consequential shift in how the Court
balances the relationship between Articles 9 and 10. Outside of Article
9’s affirmative duty to protect religious freedom, the Court’s holding
relies on two separate lines of reasoning. We will describe one as
“veracity-based” arguments—which weaken the applicability of Article
10’s protection, and “deference-based” arguments—which justify the
Court’s deference to Austria’s legislative goals and judicial findings.
The ECtHR’s veracity-based focus is clear by its delving into
semantic definitions, requiring that those seeking to exercise their right
to free expression do so “objectively,” and its weighing of the quantum
of evidence requisite to render a value-judgment sufficiently “without
factual basis” to strip it of Article 10 protection. 82 The ECtHR adopted
the Regional Court’s finding that “paedophilia” is defined as a primary
sexual interest in prepubescent children, despite Ms. E.S.’s argument
75.

Id. at 44.

76.

Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 44.

77.

See E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 57.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. ¶ 43.

80.

Id. ¶ 58.

81.

Id. ¶ 57; Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 60.

82.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 57.
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that the term is commonly used in a broader sense—to refer to men
who have sex with children. 83 Endorsing the narrower definition led the
Court to conclude that Ms. E.S. was essentially lying in the seminars.84
Relatedly, the Court held that Ms. E.S.’s failure to present information
in an “objective” way increased the probability that her statements
could arouse justified indignation. 85 Thus, because her “subjective”
statements did not contribute to Article 10’s purpose of encouraging a
debate of public interest, the Court more easily concluded that an
interference was justified by other concerns. 86 Lastly, although the
ECtHR noted that “the truth of value judgments [are] not susceptible
of proof,” it characterized Ms. E.S.’s statements as value-judgments
“without sufficient factual basis.” 87 Article 10, the Court concluded,
does not protect statements which are “based on (manifestly) untrue”
facts. 88 This focus on veracity or truthfulness is distinct from the
concerns articulated in Otto-Preminger-Institut, namely, that a
majority-Catholic population might be offended by a film depicting
religious figures in insulting ways. 89
Secondly, the Court repeatedly stated that national authorities are
due a “wide” margin of appreciation in determining whether an
interference with Article 10 is “necessary in a democratic society.”90
The ECtHR’s framing of the margin of appreciation as “wide” or
“broad” is not born out of the Court’s earlier holding in Otto83.

Id. ¶¶ 53, 54.

84.

See id. ¶ 53 (agreeing that Ms. E.S.’s characterization was “partly based
on untrue facts”; see also id. ¶ 54 (stating alternatively that Ms. E.S. had
failed to adduce “any evidence” that her statements had a factual basis).

85.

Id. ¶ 52 (accepting the domestic courts’ analysis that the statements “had
not been made in an objective manner aimed at contributing to a debate
of public interest”).

86.

Id. ¶ 57.

87.

Id. ¶¶ 48, 54.

88.

E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 55.

89.

See Otto-Preminger-Institut, at 59 (finding that the film’s advertisements
were sufficiently public to “cause offence”); see also id. (emphasizing that
“the Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the overwhelming majority
of Tyroleans.”).

90.

See E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 15 (stating the “interference
with applicant’s freedom of expression...had been necessary in a
democratic society.”). See also id. ¶ 44 (stating that the lack of uniform
requirements for protecting religious convictions “broadens the . . . margin
of appreciation when regulating freedom of expression”; id. ¶ 50
(“domestic authorities had a wide margin of appreciation . . . as they were
in a better position to evaluate which statements were likely to disturb
the religious peace in their country.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 58 (“[T]he
domestic courts did not overstep their – wide – margin of appreciation in
the instant case . . .”).
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Preminger-Institut. 91 To the contrary, in that case the ECtHR clearly
stated that while a “certain” margin of appreciation is due to national
authorities:
“The authorities’ margin of appreciation . . . is not unlimited. It
goes hand in hand with Convention supervision, the scope of
which will vary according to the circumstances. In cases such as
the present one, where there has been an interference with the
exercise of the freedoms guaranteed in [Article 10], the
supervision must be strict because of the importance of the
freedoms in question. The necessity for any restriction must be
convincingly established.” 92

Nowhere in Otto-Preminger-Institut does the ECtHR refer to the
margin of appreciation as a concept broadened or expanded beyond the
standard “regard” due to national authorities. 93 Indeed, Judges Palm,
Pekkanen, and Makarczyk dissented to reiterate that permissible
reasons for interfering with Article 10 “must be narrowly interpreted;
the State’s margin of appreciation in this field cannot be a wide one.”94
Otto-Preminger-Institut ultimately provides the doctrinal
cornerstone of the Court’s decision in E.S. v. Austria, despite any
innovations or novel analysis introduced by the latter case. Indeed,
Otto-Preminger-Institut provides the logic for subordinating
“gratuitously offensive” expressions to the need for religious peace.95
Without a framework allowing national authorities to restrict
hypothetically offensive statements in the name of protecting religious
peace or religious feelings, the Court may have reached an alternate
holding in E.S. v. Austria. The ECtHR’s departures from OttoPreminger-Institut, manifested in the veracity and deference-based
analyses, will likely influence subsequent decisions. The two major shifts
noted above—the Court’s interrogation of the statement’s factual basis
or speaker’s intentions, and increased deference to national
91.

See Javier Martínez-Torrón, supra note 69, at 601 (noting that “the
Council of Europe gathered a reduced number of States that shared a
relatively uniform concept of democracy and civil liberties.”).

92.

See Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 57–58 (emphasis
added).

93.

See id. at 59 (noting that “regard must be had to the margin of
appreciation left to the national authorities”); see also id. (finding that
the nation had not “overstepped their margin of appreciation” in
“assess[ing] the need” for a particular restriction).

94.

Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 60–61 (Judges Palm,
Pekkanen and Makarczyk, dissenting).

95.

See Religious Practice and Observance in EU Member States, at 11 (Feb.
2013),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/4743
99/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2013)474399_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93C6HSVK].
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authorities—will undoubtedly be cited in subsequent cases to justify
the necessity of interferences with rights protected by Article 10.

B. Some Normative Problems with E.S. v. Austria, and Alternative
Approaches

Skeptics offer a plethora of reasons to doubt that the ECtHR’s
current doctrine adequately protects free expression. Indeed, the
reasoning employed in E.S. v. Austria has proven somewhat frustrating
for those living within, or aspiring to adopt the principles of, nations
with more absolutist free expression regimes. The following issues,
however, stem from contradictions within the ECtHR’s own approach
to balancing rights established by Articles 9 and 10.
Austria’s “disparaging religious doctrines” offense amounts to a
blasphemy law and the ECtHR’s arguments to the contrary are
unpersuasive. The EU has recently acknowledged the inherent tension
between the right to free expression and blasphemy laws, repeatedly
disavowing such laws in recent history. 96 Calls to abolish blasphemy
convictions simultaneously accept that nations must punish actual
incitement, distinguishing between merely offensive expression and
those with a causal connection to subsequent religious hatred.97
Initially, Ms. E.S. was charged with (and acquitted of) “inciting
hatred.” 98 It is telling that, despite the EU’s insistence on dismantling
blasphemy laws and the ECtHR’s insistence that it was not enforcing
a blasphemy law, Ms. E.S. was acquitted of inciting hatred and
ultimately convicted for making statements that could hurt religious
feelings. 99
The ECtHR’s analysis went beyond Otto-Preminger-Institut,
focusing on issues that have little material connection to Ms. E.S.’s
claim under Article 10. The Court framed Ms. E.S.’s statements
96.

See, e.g., Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation
1805 (2007), ¶ 4 [hereinafter Recommendation 1805] (“[B]lasphemy, as
an insult to a religion, should not be deemed a criminal offense . . . [e]ven
though today prosecutions in this respect are rare in member states, they
are legion in other countries of the world.”). See also European
Commission for Democracy through Law, Report on the Relationship
Between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion, CDL-AD
(2008)026, § 92 [hereinafter Democracy through Law Report] (noting that
“criminal sanctions are inappropriate in respect of insult to religious
feelings and, even more so, in respect of blasphemy.”).

97.

See Recommendation 1805, supra note 96, ¶ 15 (suggesting that “national
laws should only penalize expressions about religious matters which
intentionally and severely disturb public order and call for public
violence.”); see also Democracy through Law Report, supra note 95, § 90
([I]n [the Commission’s] view, criminal sanctions are only appropriate in
respect of incitement to hatred . . .”).

98.

See E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶¶ 10, 12.

99.

See id. ¶ 12.
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regarding paedophilia as a subjective judgment, primarily because it
adopted the narrow definition proposed by the Regional Court. 100 By
construing the statements as lacking factual basis and context, the
Court was in a position to make its next two points: Article 10 does
not protect value-judgments without sufficient factual basis; and,
Article 10’s goals are not achieved without objective consideration of
public issues. 101 While both points (albeit unpersuasively) lessen the
importance of protecting Ms. E.S.’s statements under Article 10, they
have little connection to the issue of “religious peace.”
The Court’s analysis effectively invites courts to resolve free
expression cases through semantics and historical exegesis. 102 It is
doubtful, however, that objectiveness and factual sufficiency are truly
determinative in the Court’s analysis. Imagine, for example, that Ms.
E.S.’s statements were made “objectively” and with “sufficient factualbasis” (placing them fully within the protection of Article 10)—are they
therefore incapable of damaging religious peace? Probably not, and
perhaps the ECtHR would hold in such a case that her statements could
nevertheless be restricted solely based on fears of harming religious
feelings. That holding would bring the following question to the
forefront:
does Otto-Preminger-Institut permit states to silence
factually accurate, objective statements merely because a hypothetical
third-party’s religious feelings could be hurt? If so, one might wonder
how such a rule is truly compatible with a right to free expression.
The ECtHR found a convenient way to avoid that question.
Instead, the Court took a belt-and-suspenders approach by relying on
Otto-Preminger-Institut for an affirmative duty to police religiously
offensive expression, while collecting reasons for why the statements
were not objective or factual enough to deserve full Article 10
protection. 103 If the ECtHR honestly believes that the rights protected
by Articles 9 and 10 must be “balanced” when they conflict, then it
should at least respect the right to free expression instead of narrowing

100. It appears, however, that the ECtHR doubted the Regional Court’s logical
conclusion that someone could not be a paedophile if they marry and
remain married to the child past pubescence. See id ¶ 50 (“Accordingly,
and notwithstanding some of the domestic courts’ considerations such as
the duration of the marriage in question . . .”).
101. Id. ¶¶ 54, 57.
102. See Smet, supra note 12 (“By going down this road, the Court reduces
the case to a single factual question: is having sex with one child 1,400
years ago enough to be labelled a paedophile today? That is an
exceedingly narrow view of the case and entirely unhelpful for its
resolution.”).
103. Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 59–60 (discussing why the
statements made did not violate Article 10).
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it beyond recognition. 104 Following E.S. v. Austria, one wonders
whether the Court has created a doctrine in which even truthful
statements necessarily acquiesce to others’ religious feelings.
The ECtHR could resolve these tensions while still protecting both
fundamental rights, but not without doctrinal changes. First, the
ECtHR can both protect the right to religious freedom and overrule
Otto-Preminger-Institut by judging expression under an incitement
standard. 105 By using incitement, expressions that actually called for
public violence or harassed religious individuals could be limited. In
comparison—as Otto-Preminger-Institut is currently applied—
emphasizing the feelings of a hypothetical third-party functionally
makes “disparaging religious doctrine” a victimless crime. Importantly,
The EU has already suggested this option 106 and the Court gave it lipservice in E.S. v. Austria. 107 Requiring incitement would put an end to
blasphemy convictions, instead of allowing them under the guise of
“disparaging religious doctrine.” 108 Furthermore, incitement would take
the emphasis off of the speaker’s “objectiveness” and factual basis of
their subjective opinion, instead focusing on the effects of their
expression. An incitement standard would also allow courts to focus on
more concrete factual questions, compared to whether or not some
hypothetical third party’s religious feelings have been hurt. Lastly, an
incitement standard is the practical way to ensure that religious ideas
are subject to the same criticism as any other idea, while allowing
nations to protect the right to freedom of religion. The Court’s current
doctrine insulates religious individuals from potential insult, while
hypothetically protecting the same statements about a non-religious
104. See Graeme Wood, In Europe, Speech Is an Alienable Right, THE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
27,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/its-not-free-speechcriticize-muhammad-echr-ruled/574174/
[https://perma.cc/AWW83AKJ] ([I]f European courts assess freedom of speech at barely a feather’s
weight, as it appears in [E.S. v. Austria], they should spare us their
sanctimony and admit that they do not value free expression at all.”).
105. For example, whether a statement directed towards an individual has the
tendency to incite an immediate breach of the peace. This language tracks
a portion of the United States’ free speech exception for “fighting words,”
articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315. U.S. 568, 571–72
(1942).
106. See Recommendation 1805, supra note 97.
107. See E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶¶ 27-29.
108. See Smet, supra note 12; see also Simon Cottee, A Flawed European
Ruling on Free Speech, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/europe-rulesagainst-free-speech/574369/ [https://perma.cc/96PQ-73CW] (“[E.S. v.
Austria] has given legitimacy to what is in all but name an Austrian
blasphemy law …”).
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subject. 109 Drawing the line at actual incitement would do away with
this double-standard.
Second, adopting an incitement standard would helpfully
recalibrate how the ECtHR applies the margin of appreciation.
Currently, national authorities partake in judicial augury when
determining whether some hypothetical third party’s religious feelings
could have been harmed. By applying a “wide” margin of appreciation,
reviewing courts like the ECtHR only add a wider margin of error in
determining whether religious peace is actually protected. By placing
only incitement to religious hatred outside of Article 10’s protection,
national authorities would make factual determinations as to whether
or not an expression was capable of causing an immediate incitement
of religious hatred. Reviewing courts, including the ECtHR, could
thereby grant a margin of appreciation in their analysis while protecting
the right to free expression.
One final note on the principle of judicial deference inherent in the
margin of appreciation. Courts necessarily struggle with how to enforce
enumerated rights while granting proper deference to local legislatures
attempting to address social issues—difficulties in applying that
balance abound outside the ECtHR and EU. It may be illustrative to
recall a debate that occurred in the United States, between then-Judge
Antonin Scalia and Professor Richard Epstein, on the proper amount
of deference owed by courts to legislatures. In his article, Judge Scalia
noted that “[m]any believe” that the American system has suffered from
“judicializing . . . social judgments that ought better be left to the
democratic process.” 110 While criticizing “extravagant” versions of this
view, Scalia nevertheless concluded that the courts acting as an
“alternate legislature” is a “the distinctive threat of our times.” 111
Professor Epstein’s response has rather obvious application to the
ECtHR’s current approach to individual rights:
Judicial restraint is fine when it keeps courts from intervening in
areas where they have no business intervening. But the world
always has two kinds of errors: the error of commission (type I)
and the error of omission (type II) . . . what Scalia has, in effect
argued for is to minimize type I error. We run our system by

109. See Douglas Murray, Should It Be Illegal to Call Mohammed a Paedophile,
THE SPECTATOR (Oct. 27, 2018), https://spectator.us/illegal-mohammedpedophile/ [https://perma.cc/J5U3-HLSM] (suggesting that the ECtHR
has created a “two-tier critical environment in Europe,” in which some
offensive statements are restricted merely because they are directed
towards religious subjects).
110. Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in SCALIA
EPSTEIN: TWO VIEWS ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 4 (Cato Inst. 1985).
111. Id.

750

V.

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
“Balancing” Free Expression and Religious Feelings in E.S. v. Austria
being most afraid of intervention where it is not appropriate. My
view is that we should minimize both types of error. 112

The ECtHR currently applies the margin of appreciation in a way
that suggests a similar fear of intervening where inappropriate. Indeed,
other academics have recognized that deference via the margin of
appreciation doctrine often acts as an obstacle to the enforcement of
human rights. 113 The ECtHR thus appears to be focusing almost
entirely on avoiding “type I” errors at the cost of enforcing rights
protected in the Convention. The amount of political theorizing
required to address the cause (or causes) of the Court’s pattern of
deference is simply beyond the scope of this Comment. Suffice it to say,
however, that without a drastic change in doctrine, one could predict
the pattern to continue with all its attendant consequences for
individual rights.

Conclusion
The ECtHR must adopt a different theory of causation to resolve
the tensions in its contradictory treatment of Articles 9 and 10. At its
core, the direction of the Court’s doctrine on the relationship between
Articles 9 and 10 displays a serious mistrust of citizens’ resilience to
bad ideas and expression in general. 114 Otto-Preminger-Institut is
merely a manifestation of this theory of causality, in that it draws a
112. Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error,
in SCALIA V. EPSTEIN: TWO VIEWS ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 15 (Cato Inst.
1985).
113. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and
Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 844 (1999)
(“Margin of appreciation, with its principled recognition of moral
relativism, is at odds with the concept of the universality of human rights.
If applied liberally, this doctrine can undermine seriously the promise of
international enforcement of human rights that overcomes national
policies.”); see also Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and
the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the
Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 138 (2004) (recounting Lord
Lester’s appraisal of the doctrine as “standardless . . . the concept of the
margin of appreciation has become as slippery and elusive as an eel. Again
and again the Court now appears to use the margin of appreciation as a
substitute for coherent legal analysis of the issues at stake.”).
114. See Wood, supra note 102 (arguing that “virtually limitless debate has
proven highly capable” of discrediting ideas like Holocaust denial); see
also Marko Milanovic, Legitimizing Blasphemy Laws Through the
Backdoor: The European Court’s Judgment in E.S. v. Austria, EJIL:
TALK! (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/legitimizing-blasphemylaws-through-the-backdoor-the-european-courts-judgment-in-e-s-vaustria/ [https://perma.cc/SDV3-D99U] (suggesting that the Court
enforced a “vigilant nanny state” variety of religious tolerance instead of
encouraging public debate).
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direct connection between “gratuitously offensive” statements and an
interference with the right to practice one’s religion. 115 The Court’s
theory of how expression causes subsequent harm is similarly reflected
in E.S. v. Austria. Ms. E.S. was in no sense “objective” in her
discussions, 116 but to imply that individuals cannot ferret out hyperbole
or untruths without the state’s help is a dangerous idea.
One can easily imagine why, in light of history, many nations in
the EU would rather provide religious freedom with disproportionate
protection under the Convention. Bad ideas can have consequences, but
so do blasphemy laws. The ECtHR must acknowledge that the citizens
under its jurisdiction are the intermediaries between bad ideas and bad
acts. That being said, even the United States’ rough-and-tumble free
expression regime draws a line between merely offensive expression and
expression directed towards and likely to produce imminent lawless
action, 117 or constitutes a true threat. 118 Short of adopting the United
States’ free expression regime, the ECtHR could simply institute the
EU’s own suggestion that expression should only be restricted if it
incites religious hatred. This standard would create a workable
relationship between the need to protect free expression and the
pluralistic call for religious freedom. In finding a proper balance
between these two fundamental rights, that would be a start.

115. Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 57.
116. See Cottee, supra note 108 (noting that while Ms. E.S. was not speaking
in the “spirit of objectivity” . . . E.S.’s statements [about Muhammad]
were not phrased in a neutral manner aimed at being an objective
contribution.”).
117. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
118. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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